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Lucas (2004) asserts that “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most
seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution...The
potential for improving the lives of poor people by ﬁnding diﬀerent ways of distributing current
production is nothing [Italics in the original] compared to the apparently limitless potential of
increasing production.” In this article we evaluate this claim using an extended version of Lucas’
(1987) welfare evaluation framework. We construct a social welfare function following Lucas’
(2004) own suggestion of weighing everyone’s welfare equally, and compute welfare measures in
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In the 2003 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Robert Lucas asserts:
“Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion
the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution. In this very minute, a child is being
born to an American family and another child, equally valued by God [italics ours], is being born
to a family in India. The resources of all kinds that will be at the disposal of this new American
will be on the order of 15 times the resources available to his Indian brother. This seems to us a
terrible wrong, justifying direct corrective action, and perhaps some actions of this kind can and
should be taken. But of the vast increase in the well-being of hundreds of millions of people that
has occurred in the 200-year course of the industrial revolution to date, virtually none of it can be
attributed to the direct redistribution of resources from rich to poor. The potential for improving
the lives of poor people by ﬁnding diﬀerent ways of distributing current production is nothing
[Italics in the original] compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production.”
Lucas (2004)
Although the positive statements in this assertion are likely uncontroversial, the normative con-
clusion is not. Lucas stresses the overwhelming importance of economic growth and dismisses re-
distributive issues as ‘poisonous’ and quantitatively unimportant, a conclusion that is based on the
observation that economic growth helps to eliminate poverty. However, a correct assessment of the
potential beneﬁts of redistributive policies must be based on proper welfare analysis, such as the
one used by Lucas (1987) to evaluate the costs of business cycles and beneﬁts of economic growth.
Welfare analysis takes into account features of individual preferences, in particular time discounting,
aversion to consumption risk and dispersion, and inequality levels; factors that may signiﬁcantly
enhance the role of redistribution for social welfare and downplay the role of economic growth.
The view that economic growth is the major determinant of social welfare is partly supported by
Lucas’ own calculations. Lucas (1987) shocked the profession by showing how insigniﬁcant the poten-
tial welfare beneﬁts of eliminating business cycles are, particularly when compared to the potential
1gains of increasing economic growth. Lucas’ (2004) view on the costs of inequality and beneﬁts of
growth has profound implications. If right, it provides quantitative support to eliminate or limit
costly redistributive programs and institutions. Moreover, if economic growth is all that matters for
aggregate welfare, then societies should embrace growth-enhancing institutions and policies, ignoring
potentially adverse but likely minor distributive consequences. One might then wonder: “Why do
societies choose or end up with institutions that do not maximize economic growth or aggregate
economic welfare?” (Acemoglu 2005, page 1)
Lucas’ view however, is not shared by all. At least since Ricardo, distributional issues have been
considered of the utmost importance in economics. This view, for example, was expressed by Ricardo
in a famous letter to Malthus:
“Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth - I think
it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce
industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation. No law can be laid down respecting
quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid down respecting proportions. Every day I am
more satisﬁed that the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the latter only the true objects of
the science.” (Ricardo, 1951, pp. 278-279)1
This article evaluates Lucas’ (2004) assertion using a version of Lucas’ (1987) welfare evaluation
framework. As mentioned above, the distinguishing feature of welfare analysis is that cost and
gains are evaluated in present value terms, attitudes toward consumption risk and dispersion play
a role, and the degree of inequality matters. We further assess optimal inequality and optimal
growth by introducing technological restrictions — a production possibility frontier for inequality,
consumption levels and growth — into the basic welfare framework. We ﬁnd that the potential
welfare gains of inequality reduction are far from nothing, and that they may actually exceed the
potential gains of economic growth. Such an important role of inequality for welfare implies that
maximizing social welfare is not equivalent to maximizing economic growth. In fact, our ﬁndings
suggest that actual institutional choices reﬂect, to some important extent, a compromise between
1Ricardo’s view is partly explained, as Lucas (2002) points out, by the fact classical economists did not
suspect that economic growth would last.
2inequality and eﬃciency. This, of course, is an old idea (see for example, Okun 1975) but it relies
on the premise that inequality has a major eﬀect on aggregate welfare, which is precisely what our
evaluation reveals.
Lucas (1987) studies the welfare of a representative consumer characterized by an isoelastic utility
function and a log-normal distribution of consumption. He deﬁnes welfare costs in terms of permanent
compensation rates on consumption required to leave the consumer indiﬀerent between the current
situation and an alternative ideal situation.2 Lucas reports measures about the cost of business
cycles for diﬀerent degrees of intertemporal substitutability, but unfortunately only reports welfare
measures of economic growth for the log-utility case.
We extend this framework in three ways: we evaluate welfare gains of growth not only for the
log case but also when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution diﬀers from one; we introduce
consumption inequality across individuals; and ﬁnally, we introduce technological restrictions.
First, we consider diﬀerent degrees of intertemporal substitutability to assess the social beneﬁts
and costs of inequality and growth. This simple extension is important because the existing empirical
literature typically regards the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) to be lower than one,
and welfare measures depend signiﬁcantly on the size of this elasticity.3 For example, the welfare
gains of economic growth are lower than the costs of business cycles if the IES is suﬃciently low.
For commonly used values of the IES, however, the gains of economic growth are signiﬁcant but
perhaps smaller than previously thought. We ﬁnd that the welfare gains of one additional point of
economic growth per year range from 2% to 21% for the various values of the IES considered by
Lucas (1987). These gains are typically lower than the 20% reported by Lucas. For a per-capita
consumption growth rate of 2.1% — the 1960-2000 average for the 108 economies analyzed here —
the welfare gains of total economic growth range from 7.6% to 51%.
The second extension is to introduce consumption dispersion across individuals. For welfare
evaluation, this extension requires the choice of a social welfare function, a potentially controversial
issue. Sources of controversy include the existence of a social welfare function, ordinal versus cardinal
2Details and some caveats are given below.
3Two classic examples are Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) who ﬁnd the IES to be close to zero.
3ordering, and aggregation (see Sen 1970 for a discussion). Fortunately, Lucas’ assertion suggests a
natural choice for the welfare function. First, Lucas’ quantitative claim presumes the existence of
a cardinal ordering of preferences that makes interpersonal comparison of utilities possible. Second,
he proposes that everyone should be ‘equally valued’ in the social welfare function. These two
observations suggest the use of a classical utilitarian or Benthamite social welfare function, a function
that weighs everyone equally.
We further assume, following a standard practice in macroeconomics, that all individuals have
identical preferences. This assumption is suggested by Lucas’ idea of treating the American and
Indian children as ‘brothers’, and gives further support to the use of an utilitarian welfare function.4
Our model thus assumes that inequality arises from unequal opportunities rather than diﬀerences in
tastes. Due to the concavity of the individual’s utility function, our social welfare function implies that
any inequality is socially costly. By construction, the social welfare function penalizes consumption
diﬀerences across individuals in the same way that individuals penalize consumption diﬀerences across
states and time.
We use the extended model to compute welfare costs of within-country and cross-country inequal-
ity. Measures of within-country consumption inequality are based on US estimates from Krueger and
Perri (2002). Measures of cross-country consumption inequality are based on the Penn World Tables.
Inequality in our model is fully characterized by the standard deviation of cross-sectional consump-
tion. The cost of inequality is deﬁned as a permanent compensation rate on consumption required
to leave the social planner indiﬀerent between the observed situation and an ideal situation with no
cross-sectional dispersion.
We ﬁnd that the welfare costs of inequality are large and, perhaps surprisingly, likely larger than
the gains of economic growth. They range from 12% to 91% for within-country inequality, and from
40% to almost 100% for cross-country inequality, for various values of the IES. Why are the potential
welfare costs of inequality seemingly larger than the gains of growth? After all, economic growth
aﬀects all individuals alike and therefore has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on aggregate welfare. Changes in
4Harsanyi (1953, 55, 82), Vickey (1960), and Mirless (1982), among others, support the use a utilitarian welfare
function on ethical grounds. Pattanaik (1968) criticizes utilitarianism but recognizes that it is the proper formulation
if individuals have identical preferences.
4inequality, in contrast, have oﬀsetting eﬀects on individuals and therefore should have only second-
order eﬀects on social welfare. This conjecture turns out to be incorrect for three reasons. First,
most of the gains of economic growth occur in the future while the costs of inequality are borne every
period. Second, inequality is large. While the standard deviation of the log of aggregate consumption
is around 1 to 2% — which explains the small welfare costs of business cycles uncovered by Lucas —
the standard deviation of the cross sectional distribution of log consumption is around 50% within
countries and around 100% across countries. These ﬁgures imply that consumption dispersion is larger
than mean consumption both within countries and across countries. Third, commonly used values
of the IES entail substantial social aversion to any source of consumption dispersion, in particular
social aversion to inequality.
An alternative way to understand why inequality is so costly is to interpret the welfare function as
the lifetime utility of a newborn child, an interpretation that is probably closer to Lucas’ assertion.5
Under this interpretation, the social planner cares only about newborns and values all children
equally, the ‘American child and his Indian brother.’ If given a choice before birth, what level of
growth and inequality would such a child choose behind this Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ knowing that
his place of birth is random? Although growth is clearly welfare-enhancing, this hypothetical child
faces huge consumption risk, and a non-trivial probability of poverty, which substantially reduces
expected utility.
Further insight into the cost of inequality is obtained by performing counterfactual experiments.
We ask: (i) how much growth would society be willing to give up for perfect equality? (ii) what level
of inequality would compensate for the lack of economic growth? and (iii) what would be the welfare
consequences of eliminating all growth and inequality simultaneously?
Consider the answer to these questions for an intermediate value of the IES of 1/2. In response
to the ﬁrst question we ﬁnd that a planner would give up 1.62 points of economic growth (out of
2.1 points) to eliminate all within-country inequality, and 4.49 points to eliminate all cross-country
inequality. The answer to the second question is that a reduction of 34% of cross-country inequality
or 136% of within-country inequality would compensate for the lack of growth. For the third question,
5Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and Vickrey (1960) provide similar interpretations of the social welfare function.
5we ﬁnd that eliminating all growth and cross-country inequality is welfare improving — a 48% welfare
gain — but eliminating growth and within-country inequality reduces welfare — a 9% welfare fall.
Overall, these ﬁgures suggest that cross-country inequality is the major determinant of worldwide
welfare, and that within-country inequality is as important as growth for country welfare.
An alternative way to evaluate Lucas’ assertion is to compute the shadow price of inequality in







. If Lucas is right, this price must be close to zero. Moreover, if social decisions are
nearly optimal then this shadow price provides not only an assessment of the social willingness to
trade inequality for growth, but also an assessment of what is technologically feasible. We ﬁnd that
the price of inequality is typically far from zero. For various values of the IES, this price ranges from
0.026 to 6.55 for within-country inequality, and from 0.0521 to 13.11 for cross-country inequality.
These basic welfare measures provide only upper bounds to the actual gains and costs because
they ignore the costs of redistributive policies, and in particular, overlook potential tradeoﬀs between
eﬃciency and inequality. Speciﬁcally, the welfare gain of economic growth ignores the possibility
that additional growth may foster inequality. Similarly, the welfare cost of inequality ignores the real
possibility that eliminating inequality may also adversely aﬀect incentives, reduce economic growth,
and the level of consumption.
Our third extension to Lucas (1987) is to introduce technological constraints. For this purpose,
we restrict our analysis to within-country inequality. We postulate a simple reduced form technology
that seeks to capture the major tradeoﬀs that a social planner faces at the country level. The
technological frontier is deﬁned in the space of inequality, growth, and consumption levels. We
provide two diﬀerent calibrations of this frontier using US and Scandinavian data from Aaberge et
al. (2002), and data from West and East Germany from various sources. The model is then used to
compute optimal levels of inequality, growth, and initial consumption level.
We ﬁnd that the current US values of inequality, growth, and consumption levels are close to
their optimal values if the IES is around 1/2. However, if this elasticity is smaller, as various studies
6suggest, then there is excessive inequality in the US.6 For example, if the IES is 1/5, then the optimal
level of inequality is close to the one observed in Scandinavian countries, and the welfare costs of
maintaining current suboptimal choices is around 15%.
In conclusion, we show that the gross and net cost of inequality are likely to be large. Instead of
Lucas or Ricardo’s, our ﬁndings supports Okun’s view:
“I am wandering away from my usual concerns brieﬂy to discuss an even more nagging and
pervasive tradeoﬀ, that between inequality and eﬃciency. It is, in my view, our biggest socioe-
conomic tradeoﬀ, and it plagues us in dozens of dimensions of social policy.” (Okun, 1975, page
2)
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model for welfare analysis based on Lucas
(1987), derives welfare measures, calibrates the parameters, and reports results; Section 3 extends
the model of Section 2 by introducing technological restrictions, derives optimal choices, calibrates
the parameters, and reports results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Welfare Analysis
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 The Distribution of Consumption
Consider a world composed of a large number of countries (a continuum), with each country equally
populated by a large number of individuals (also a continuum). The size of the world population is
normalized to 1. The time-t consumption of a particular individual in the world is described by the
autoregressive process
(1) lnct = ρlnct−1 + (1 − ρ)(a + bt) + σηηt + σ￿￿t,
6A major reason to believe that this elasticity is small is the equity-premium puzzle. See Kocherlakota (1996, page
pg 52).
7where ρ ∈ [0,1) is the persistence of consumption, a and b are constants, ηt is a country-speciﬁc
shock, and ￿t is an individual-speciﬁc shock, both assumed to be independently drawn from a stan-
dard normal distribution. Individuals in the same country share the same draw of ηt. Under these
assumptions, the unconditional distribution of consumption satisﬁes

















We assume that the law of large number holds so that there is no aggregate uncertainty at the
worldwide level. Furthermore, we assume that the initial distribution of consumption is given by its
unconditional distribution evaluated at time t = 0 :







These assumptions imply that the worldwide distribution of consumption at any point in time is
described by (2). According to this cross-sectional interpretation of (2), σ2
y measures the degree of
within-country inequality — inequality associated with individual factors — and σ2
x measures cross-
country inequality — inequality associated with country-speciﬁc factors. This framework can be used
to analyze a single country if σ2
x = 0, or a group of countries populated by identical individuals if
σ2
y = 0.
Parameters a and b are chosen so that aggregate worldwide consumption at time t, Ect, equals
(1 + λ)(1 + µ)







and b = ln(1 + µ). In this speciﬁ-
cation, µ is the growth rate of worldwide consumption, and λ is the worldwide level of consumption
at time 0, which determines the level of consumption in any subsequent period. λ is used below to
measure the welfare gains and costs of diﬀerent experiments, and it is set to 0 in the baseline case.
82.1.2 Individual and Social Welfare
The welfare of an individual with initial consumption c0 is described by the expected utility function







where E0 is the mathematical expectation conditional on time−0 information, and u is a momentary





where F(c) is the fraction of the population with consumption below or equal to c at time 0.
F is implicitly deﬁned by (4). There are least two alternative interpretations of W. First, W is a
standard utilitarian social welfare function that weighs everyone’s welfare equally. Second, W is the
expected welfare of a newborn child, EU. Furthermore, depending on the values of σx and σy, a
‘society’ could designate the world — if σx > 0 and σy > 0− or a particular country — if σx = 0.
Our choice of the social welfare function is inspired by Lucas’ (2004) suggestion that a social planner
(‘God’) places equal weight (‘equally valued’) on individuals similar at birth (‘American and Indian
brothers’). The diﬀerence between individuals is not to be found in diﬀerent tastes, but diﬀerent
endowment of resources (‘The resources of all kinds that will be at the disposal of this new American
will be on the order of 15 times the resources available to his Indian brother.’).
We further simplify the problem by assuming u(c) = c1−γ−1
1−γ , where 1/γ > 0 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES), and γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Given that F is given
by (4), W satisﬁes:


























9Substituting for the deﬁnitions of a and b, and simplifying produces
















Accordingly, social welfare depends on the initial level of consumption, λ, the growth of consump-
tion, µ, the total dispersion of consumption, measured by σ2
x + σ2
y, and preference parameters γ and
β. It easy to check that inequality reduces social welfare (∂W
∂σ2 < 0) and growth increases social welfare
(∂W
∂µ > 0). Notice that the degree of persistence, ρ, only aﬀects social welfare through its eﬀect on
consumption dispersion, σ2
x + σ2
y. Thus, social mobility only matters for social welfare to the extent
that it aﬀects the level of inequality. Furthermore, the social welfare function implicitly assumes
that the coeﬃcient of inequality aversion equals the coeﬃcient of risk aversion, and the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Atkinson 1970).7 In other words, the planner penalizes
consumption dispersion across individuals in the same way that individuals penalize consumption
dispersion across states and time.
In order to perform welfare comparisons, we need to compute a baseline welfare level, W0, deter-





y0. The baseline welfare level
satisﬁes
(8) W0 = W(0,µ0,σ2
0)
The following subsections use the above framework to deﬁne a number of welfare measures. We
ﬁrst deﬁne welfare costs and gains as the proportional increase in consumption necessary to leave
the social planner indiﬀerent between a baseline and an alternative situation. We then present the
welfare costs of inequality as the amount of growth a planner would give up to eliminate inequality.
Finally, we present some preliminary measures of the tradeoﬀ between inequality and growth — ﬁrst,
by quantifying the welfare costs of eliminating all growth and all inequality simultaneously; second
in the form of a marginal rate of substitution between inequality and growth.
7See also Auerbach and Hassett (1999), and Kaplow (2003) for a discussion and generalizations, and Harsanyi (1975)
for a critique of the generalizations.
102.1.3 Standard Welfare Measures
Following Lucas (1987), we deﬁne four measures of social gains (or costs, if negative), λµ, λx, λy and










These values of λ0s are the proportional changes of consumption required to leave the world
planner indiﬀerent between the baseline consumption path with welfare W0, and an alternative con-
sumption path with welfare W. Notice that the λ0s aﬀect the consumption path of the alternative
situation, not the baseline situation. Thus, for example, λµ is the proportional change in con-
sumption, uniform across all periods, countries, and individuals, required to leave the world planner
indiﬀerent between the baseline consumption path, and a path with no growth (but a higher initial
consumption level measured by λµ). Notice also that λµ > 0 and (λx,λy,λ0) < 0. These measures
can be interpreted in the following way: λµ is the welfare gain of economic growth, λx is the welfare
cost of cross-country inequality, λy is the welfare cost of within-country inequality, and λ0 is welfare










(10) λi = e−γσ2
i/2 − 1 for i = {x,y,0}.
These formulas reveal three important properties of the welfare measures. First, welfare measures
depend only on the single relevant parameter. For example, λy depends only on σ2
y but not on µ or σ2
x.
11This is mainly a consequence of assuming an isoelastic utility function and a log-normal distribution
of consumption. An important implication of this result is that the welfare costs of within-country
inequality and gains of economic growth are the same regardless of whether the society is the world
(so that σx > 0) or a country (so that σx = 0).
Second, λµ is strictly decreasing in γ : growth is less attractive if consumers are less willing
to substitute consumption intertemporally, a result that is well-known in the risk-free rate puzzle
literature (see Kocherlakota 1996). Third, λi increases exponentially with γ. This result follows
naturally from the fact that a more concave momentary utility function makes any dispersion of
consumption more costly. These last two results imply that the welfare gains of economic growth can
be made arbitrarily small and the welfare costs of inequality arbitrarily large by increasing γ.
Another interesting welfare measure is the gain associated with one additional percentage point
of economic growth, λ1%. It is deﬁned as
W0 = W(λ1%,µ0 − 0.01,σ2
0).
Using (7), λ1% is given by
(11) λ1% =
"
1 − β (1 + µ0 − 0.01)
(1−γ)





2.1.4 Alternative Welfare Measures
The welfare measures just deﬁned cannot be easily compared to each other. For example, λµ is
a compensation rate on a ﬂat consumption path while λy is a compensation rate on a growing
consumption path. Thus, for example, a case in which λµ = −λy would actually imply that the
welfare gains of economic growth are lower than the welfare costs of within-country inequality. The
following welfare measures have the advantage of being deﬁned as compensation rates on the same

















s are thus deﬁned as percentage changes relative to the baseline consumption path rather
than the alternative consumption path. These deﬁnitions imply that b λµ < 0 and (b λx,b λy,b λ0) > 0.
These measures can be interpreted in the following way: b λµ is the welfare cost of no growth, b λy
is the welfare gain of eliminating within-country inequality, b λx is the welfare gain of eliminating
cross-country inequality, and b λ0 is the welfare gain of eliminating all inequality. The equations above
have the following simple solutions:





(13) b λi =
1
1 + λi
− 1 for i = {x,y,0}.
and similarly for b λ1%.
2.1.5 Welfare Measures in Terms of Growth Rates
Another way to compensate the planner for alternative consumption paths is through changes in the
growth rate of consumption, µ, rather than through changes in the level of consumption, λ. One can
13deﬁne welfare cost measures in terms of growth rates, µx, µy, and µ0 as follows:
W0 = W(0,µ0 + µx,σ2
0 − σ2
x0),
W0 = W(0,µ0 + µy,σ2
0 − σ2
y0),
W0 = W(0,µ0 + µ0,0).
According to these deﬁnitions, µy represents the additional points of economic growth that the
planner would be willing to accept in exchange for eliminating within-country inequality. Naturally,
µy < 0. Similarly, µx and µ0 are the points of economic growth that the planner would be willing
to accept in exchange for eliminating cross-country and total consumption inequality respectively.













− (1 + µ0) for i = {x,y,0}.
2.1.6 Welfare Gains of Growth in Terms of Inequality
An alternative way to compensate the planner for the absence of economic growth is through changes
in the levels of inequality rather than in the levels of consumption. For this purpose, deﬁne the rates










According to these deﬁnitions, θi × 100 is the percentage reduction in inequality (either cross-
country, within-country, or total inequality) that a planner would be willing to accept in exchange




ln(1 − β) − ln
￿
1 − β (1 + µ0)
(1−γ)
￿i
γ (1 − γ)σ2
i
for i = {x,y,0}.
142.1.7 Net Welfare Consequences of Growth and Inequality
It is often argued in the literature that inequality is partly the result of providing individuals with
incentives conducive to economic growth. It is therefore natural to wonder what the consequences of
eliminating inequality and economic growth at the same time would be. The welfare consequences








Thus, λ is a net welfare gain (cost if negative) of the current inequality-growth combination.
Using the deﬁnitions above and (7), it follows that:








− 1 for i = {x,y,0}
2.1.8 The Shadow Price of Inequality
One way to interpret Lucas’ assertion is that a society must be willing to trade only a small reduction
in growth for a one point reduction in inequality. If so, the social marginal rate of substitution between
inequality and growth must be close to zero. We can compute this marginal rate around (σi0,µ0)








γ − β (1 + µ0)
β
for i = {x,y,0}
Lucas’ assertion suggests MRSi
1 = 0. Notice that MRSi
1 increases linearly with the degree of
inequality and exponentially with γ.
One can alternatively compute the marginal rate of substitution between inequality and consump-





= σi0γ for i = {x,y,0}.
2.2 Calibration
In order to compute welfare measures we need to calibrate the parameters µ0, σ2
x0, σ2
y0, γ and β.
Figure 1 shows the unweighted and weighted averages of the log of consumption per capita in 108
economies between 1960 and 2000. The data is from the Penn World Tables 6.1. Population size from
each country is used to compute weighted averages. The average growth rate of yearly per-capita
consumption is 2.3% and its standard deviation is 1.17% for the unweighted average, and 2.1% and
0.99% respectively for the weighted average. This evidence suggests that µ0 = 2.1%.
Figure 2 shows the unweighted and weighted standard deviations of the log of per-capita consump-
tion across countries from 1960 to 2000. The unweighted and weighted averages provide diﬀerent
characterizations of the evolution of cross-country dispersion. The unweighted average suggests a
signiﬁcant increase of consumption dispersion during this 40-year period. However, the weighted
average suggests that the dispersion has remained roughly constant over the long term, and in fact,
has actually decreased during the past 25 years, after increasing signiﬁcantly during the 1960-1975
period. Figure 2 thus suggests that σx0 = 1.
International evidence about the dispersion of consumption within countries is scarce. Some
authors report measures of income dispersion within countries (e.g. Bourguignon and Morrison
(2002), Sala-i-Martin (2002)), but not of consumption dispersion. Diﬀerences in dispersion between
consumption and income may be signiﬁcant. Krueger and Perri (2002, Figure 1) provide some
estimates about the dispersion of individual consumption and income for the United States. They
ﬁnd that the standard deviation of the log of individual consumption, controlling for age and race,
has been roughly constant in a 25-year period at around 0.48. The dispersion of per-capita income
is about twice as large. Based on this evidence, we choose σy0 = 0.5.
Numerous studies present an estimate of γ but there is little consensus about its proper value.
At one extreme, Hall (1988) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) ﬁnd the IES to be close to zero (or
16γ w ∞).8 At the other extreme, Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996) suggest that the IES is close to 1
(γ w 1). We follow Lucas (1987) and compute welfare measures for diﬀerent values of the IES 1
γ or
for γ ∈ [1,2,5,10,20].9
Finally, we calibrate β using the standard procedure of targeting a value for the risk free interest
rate. This implies that β depends on γ. Since there is country risk in our framework, only bonds
traded internationally can be completely risk free. If r is the interest rate paid on a risk free bond,
individual optimization implies the following Euler equation:
c
−γ
t = β (1 + r)Etc
−γ
t+1.
According to equation (1), ct+1 = c
ρ
te(a+b(t+1))(1−ρ)zt+1, where lnzt+1 = σηηt + σ￿￿t. Thus,
c
−γ















1−ρ [β (1 + r)]
− 1
γ(1−ρ) .














1−ρ [β (1 + r)]
− 1
γ(1−ρ) .
Finally, simplifying and solving for 1 + r produces:
1 + r =
(1 + µ)
γ














Note the diﬀerent components of this expression. The ﬁrst is a standard purely deterministic com-
8Many researchers regard the equity premium puzzle as evidence that γ is large. See Kocherlakota (1996, pg. 52)
for references.
9We approximate the log case (γ = 1) by using γ = 1.01 in the formulas above instead of providing additional
derivations.
17ponent, inducing a positive relationship between γ and r. This positive relationship is the source of
the risk-free rate puzzle (see Kocherlakota 1996). For a given level of r, this ﬁrst component would
imply a positive relationship between γ and β. The second component captures the persistence of
consumption overtime, an eﬀect that drives the risk-free rate downward as γ increases. The ﬁnal
component captures precautionary motives. The presence of individual and country risks induce
precautionary savings that drive the risk-free rate downward as γ increases. For a given target level
of r, the two last components induce a negative relationship between β and γ.
The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates only if consumption is not very persistent and consumption risk is small.
However, according to equation (3) the observed large degree of within-country and cross-country
inequality must come either from signiﬁcant consumption persistence or from large consumption risk,
or both. The last two eﬀects turn out to dominate producing a negative relationship between β and










We assume that the model’s period is one year and pick r = 5%. This choice allows us to replicate
β = 0.95 for γ = 1, the value used by Lucas (1987).10 We ﬁnd that β decreases dramatically with
γ unless ρ is very close to 1. To prevent a dramatic fall of β for large γ we set ρ = 0.9999.11 This
choice implies relative small consumption risk, ση = 1.41% and σ￿ = 0.71%, and a β equal to 0.90











y0. Given the calibrated values of σx0 and σy0, the choice of ρ
only aﬀects the values of ση and σ￿.
All parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
10A value for r around 5% is typically used in the literature. For example, King and Rebelo (2000) use r = 6.5%
which is the postwar U.S. average of the annual return on capital. A larger value of r will strengthen our results.
11A large ρ is consistent with Constantiniades and Duﬃe (1995), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Storeletten et al.
(2004), Casta˜ neda et al. (2003), but inconsistent with Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Aiyagari (1994).







y. The large value of σ
2
y still implies a negative relationship between β and γ. Moreover,
we would still need a large value of ρ (=0.9995) to obtain β = 0.9 for γ = 20.
182.3 Results
Table 2 reports the welfare measures deﬁned in Section 2.2.1 for the parameters described above and
for diﬀerent values of γ and β. Recall that λµ is the welfare gain of economic growth, λx is the
welfare cost of cross-country inequality, λy is the welfare cost of within-country inequality, and λ0
is the welfare cost of total inequality. The table reproduces Lucas’ (1987) ﬁnding that the welfare
gains from economic growth, as described by λµ and λ1%, are substantial if γ is close to 1. These
gains, however, signiﬁcantly decrease as γ increases. For example, Lucas reports a 20% gain from 1
additional point of economic growth, but the table shows that if γ takes an intermediate value of 5,
the gains are 8.5% instead. Total gains of economic growth as measured by µ are between 8% and
51%.
The novel and surprising result reported in Table 2 is the large welfare costs associated with
consumption inequality, both within and across countries. Costs of inequality range from around
12% to 92% for within-country inequality, and from around 40% to almost 100% for cross-country
inequality. In fact, the gains of economic growth are smaller than the cost of total inequality if
γ ≥ 1.11, smaller than the cost of cross-country inequality if γ ≥ 1.28, and smaller than the cost of
within-country inequality if γ ≥ 3.2.
Overall, the results reported in Table 2 contradicts Lucas’ (2004) assertion that the beneﬁts
of growth dwarf the costs of inequality. These ﬁgures are staggering and reveal how important
inequality is for aggregate welfare. In recent years, many authors have argued that Lucas’ original
calculation understates the true cost of business cycles because of his restrictive assumptions on
preferences, homogeneity of consumers, or his choice of matching the risk implied in aggregate rather
than individual data (see Lucas 2003 or Barlevy 2005 for a survey of this literature). When some
of these assumptions are relaxed, the cost of business cycle can reach 3-4% for households with no
wealth (e.g. Beaudry and Pages 2001, or Krusell and Smith 1999) or be as large as 12% with less
restrictive preferences (e.g. Tallarini 2000). But even these estimates of the costs of business cycles
seem small relative to the costs of inequality.
Table 3 reports the alternative welfare measures described in Section 2.2.2. Recall that b λµ is
19the welfare cost of no growth, and b λx is the welfare gain of eliminating cross-country inequality, b λy
is the welfare gain of eliminating within-country inequality. The message is similar to the one in
Table 2, but the magnitudes, particularly regarding the welfare consequences of inequality, are even
more staggering. These welfare measures can be interpreted as proportional taxes (if negative) or
proportional subsidies (if positive) on the baseline consumption path that leaves the planner indif-
ferent between the after-tax (subsidy) baseline consumption path and the alternative path. Consider
γ = 2 for example. Eliminating economic growth is equivalent to introducing a permanent 28%
tax on consumption, eliminating within-country inequality is equivalent to introducing a permanent
28% subsidy on consumption, and eliminating cross-country inequality is equivalent to introducing a
permanent 249% subsidy on consumption (!).
The major drawback of these welfare measures is that they ignore potential trade-oﬀs between
eﬃciency and inequality. Higher economic growth may cause more inequality. On the other hand,
inequality may foster growth. For example, the prospect of appropriating higher returns without
the fear of redistributive taxation may spur investment, eﬀort, and innovation. The next section
addresses this concern by introducing a technological tradeoﬀ between inequality and consumption
growth and levels. In this section, we provide an indirect assessment by studying the planner’s
willingness to substitute equality for growth.
A ﬁrst measure of this tradeoﬀ is given by the reduction in growth that would perfectly oﬀset
the gains of eliminating inequality. These welfare measures were described in Section 2.2.3 and are
reported in Table 4 under the labels µi, i = {x,y,0}. For example, µy = −3.1% for γ = 5 means that
the planner would accept a reduction of 3.1 points in the growth rate of consumption in exchange
for eliminating all within-country inequality. Since the baseline growth rate is 2.1%, the new growth
rate would be −1%. All the µ−welfare measures are negative, in most cases implying negative net
growth rates, which again reveals the staggering social costs of inequality.
A second measure of this tradeoﬀ is given by the reduction in inequality that would compensate
the planner for the elimination of growth. These welfare measures were described in Section 2.2.4
and are reported in Table 4 under the labels θi, i = {x,y,0}. For example, θy = 36% for γ = 5 means
that the planner only requires a 36% reduction of within-country inequality to be compensated for
20the lack of growth. The fact that most θ0s are below 36% suggests that relative small reductions in
inequality would compensate for the absence of growth.
A third measure of this tradeoﬀ are the welfare consequences of eliminating growth and inequality
simultaneously. These welfare measures were described in Section 2.2.5 and are reported in Table
4 under the labels λi, i = {x,y,0}. For example, λy = −33% for γ = 5 means a large welfare gain
of eliminating inequality and growth. The fact that most λi
0
are negative suggests that there is too
much inequality relative to growth.13
A ﬁnal measure of this tradeoﬀ is given by the social marginal rate of substitution between
inequality and growth, deﬁned in Section 2.2.6. and reported in Table 4 under the label MRSi
1 for
i = {x,y,0}. Given our framework, we can construct social indiﬀerence curves between inequality
and growth deﬁned by W(0,µ,σ2) = W0. 14 This indiﬀerence curve traces all combinations of growth
rates and consumption dispersion of alternative consumption paths that produce the same welfare
as the baseline situation. The slope of this map determines the willingness of the planner to trade
inequality for growth. The top panel of Figure 3 illustrates these indiﬀerence maps for various values
of γ. According to Lucas (2004), the shadow price of inequality must be close to zero, or alternatively
the social indiﬀerence curve must be ﬂat. The table shows, however, that this is not generally the




∂σy = 0.371 means that the shadow price of 1 point of
inequality, measured by σ, is around 1
3 of a point of economic growth. Even for γ = 1 the shadow
price of inequality is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Finally, Table 4 also reports the marginal rate of substitution between inequality and the con-
sumption level (MRSi
2) deﬁned in Section 2.2.6. This is a more relevant tradeoﬀ, as we discuss in
the next Section, because growth rates tend to be similar across countries in spite of diﬀerent degrees
of inequality, but consumption levels vary widely. This shadow price of inequality is also diﬀerent
from zero, and in most cases signiﬁcantly larger than one. For example, MRS
y
2 = ∂λ
∂σy = 2.5 for
γ = 5 means that the planner would be willing to permanently give up 2.5% of consumption for a
13For γ ≤ 2.5, eliminating only within-country inequality and growth is detrimental to welfare. However, even in that
case a reduction of inequality has a signiﬁcant ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare. For example, for γ = 1 eliminating growth
would imply a loss of 51%, but also eliminating within-country inequality reduces this loss to 33%.










21permanent reduction of 1 point of inequality.
Why is inequality so costly? One way to explain the magnitude of the cost is to interpret the
welfare function W(λ,µ,σ2) as the lifetime utility of a newborn child. If given a choice before birth,
what level of growth and cross-country inequality would such a child choose behind this Rawlsian
‘veil of ignorance’ knowing that his country of birth is random? Although growth is clearly welfare-
enhancing, this hypothetical child faces a non-trivial probability of poverty, which reduces expected
utility. As risk aversion rises, increases in inequality must be compensated with much higher growth.
The last two welfare measures also reﬂect the technological tradeoﬀ if the observed social choices
are optimal. In that case, observed choices lie both on the social indiﬀerence curve and on the
production possibility frontier. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3. If social choices
are suboptimal however, we need to specify technological constraints — i.e. we need to specify what
levels of growth, inequality and consumption are actually feasible — in order to determine actual
welfare costs and gains rather than just potential costs and gains. The remainder of the paper
addresses this issue.
3 Optimal Inequality
3.1 The Planner’s Problem
In this Section we seek to provide some assessment about the optimal level of inequality. For this
purpose, we introduce technological restrictions into the welfare framework of the previous section.
We assume that social preferences over the consumption level, 1 + λ, the consumption growth rate
µ, and the inequality level, σ2, are described by the social welfare function (7). For convenience, we






1 − β (1 + µ)
1−γ
￿.
22Furthermore, we postulate that the technological frontier is described by the function
(18) σ = A(1 + µ)
ε1 (1 + λ)
ε2 , A > 0,ε1 ≥ 0,ε2 ≥ 0.
This restriction describes the technological tradeoﬀs between inequality, growth, and consumption
levels. This formulation is a reduced form approximation of what is likely to be a very complex
determination of consumption levels, growth, and inequality. One can think, for example, that
within-country inequality is the result of providing proper incentives to individuals who possess
private information about their own abilities, as in Atkenson and Lucas (1992). The social optimal
policy may induce signiﬁcant inequality in order to elicit private information. A full solution of such
a model is beyond the scope of this paper.15 We only provide some suggestive results.
For cross-country inequality, the reason for a technological trade-oﬀ between inequality, growth
and levels is less clear. Private information issues that could explain the need for within-country
inequality do not apply at the country level. When information is public, a worldwide planner
could in principle design a non-distortionary tax scheme. The major technological restriction at the
worldwide level seems to be an enforcement problem. A worldwide social planner would be unable to
enforce any progressive cross-country tax schemes.16 If no worldwide redistribution is feasible, then
current cross-country inequality is the constrained eﬃcient and not much more could be said. None
of the large potential welfare gains documented in the previous section can be realized. Since we lack
any knowledge about the shape of (18) for cross-country inequality, we focus the remaining analysis
on within-country inequality.
15Solving a version of such a model would require us to address major theoretical and computational issues. One
major problem is getting around the immizeration result to obtain a stationary distribution (see Sleet and Yeltekin
2005, Phelan 2003, and Farhi and Wening 2005 for recent contributions).
16A Pareto improvement could be obtained by allowing countries to share their aggregate risk so that consumption
at the country level will grow deterministically. Since consumption is highly persistent, the resulting cross-country
dispersion of consumption with perfect risk-sharing would be similar to the current distribution. Thus, the major
gains from a worldwide planner’s perspective would not come from sharing country risk but from redistributing initial
resources.
233.2 Optimal Choices







1 − β (1 + µ)
1−γ
￿ .
Maximizing this function over λ and µ respectively provides the following optimality conditions:
(19) 1 = ε2γA2 (1 + µ∗)
2ε1 (1 + λ∗)
2ε2 = ε2γσ∗2
(20)
β (1 + µ∗)
1−γ
1 − β (1 + µ∗)
1−γ = ε1γA2 (1 + µ∗)
2ε1 (1 + λ∗)
2ε2 = ε1γσ∗2





This expression states that optimal inequality depends positively on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, 1
γ, and negatively on the elasticity of inequality to the level of consumption. The
discount factor and, in particular, ε1 play no role in determining optimal inequality. Substituting
(21) into (20) and solving for 1 + µ∗ produces:









This expression states that if γ > 1 — the empirically relevant case — then the optimal growth





> 1 is required for
positive growth. If this condition is satisﬁed, then the optimal growth rate depends negatively on γ.
Thus, the growth rate is larger if a society is more patient and less risk averse.
Moreover, the optimal consumption level λ∗ is found by substituting (21) and (22) into (18) and
24solving for λ∗. The solution is:








Finally, optimal social welfare is given by W∗ = W (λ∗,µ∗,σ∗). We can compute the welfare cost
associated with the baseline choices, λc, as the solution to W(0,µ0,σ2) = (1 + λc)
1−γ W∗. Thus,







In order to compute optimal inequality we only need an estimate of ε2. It follows from (18) that
ε2 = ∂ lnσ
∂ ln(1+λ). This elasticity could be computed using the percentage diﬀerences in inequality relative
to percentage diﬀerence in consumption per-capita for two similar countries with similar growth rates.
A case that has been well documented is that of the U.S. versus Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden). According to the Penn World Tables 6.1, average per-capita income in the U.S.
was around 24% higher than the average of Scandinavian countries in 1990, and around 25% higher
in 2000. The relative stability of this diﬀerence means that the U.S. and Scandinavian countries
share similar growth rates. These ﬁgures suggest to pick λ = 25% or 4ln(1 + λ) = ln1.25.
Regarding diﬀerences in inequality, Aaberge et al. (2000, Table 2) report Gini coeﬃcients of
disposable income distribution for the US and Scandinavian countries for diﬀerent years up to 1990.
They ﬁnd a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.346 for the U.S. and an average Gini of 0.2173 for Scandinavian in
1990. Assuming that disposable income is lognormal distributed, Gini coeﬃcients can be transformed















Solving this equation gives a standard deviation of 0.634 for the US and of 0.39 for Scandinavian
countries, or a ratio of 1.63. Assuming that this ratio also applies for the distribution of consumption,
25one obtains 4lnσ = ln1.63.




ln1.25 = 2.19. Again, this elasticity and γ is all that is needed to compute optimal inequality.
Estimates of A and ε1 are needed to compute optimal choices λ∗ and µ∗ and welfare costs of
current choices, λc. To compute A, we assume that the observed levels of σ, µ, and λ, (σy0,µ0,0) lie
on the technological frontier. In that case, A can be solved from (18), given ε1, as A = σy0 (1 + µ0)
−ε1 .
We provide two diﬀerent estimates of ε1. The ﬁrst one assumes that the baseline growth rate is
optimal. This is likely to provide a robust estimate of ε1 since long-term growth does not seems to
diﬀer much across countries (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 2004), suggesting current growth rates are




β−1 (1 + µ0)
γ−1 − 1
.
This way of estimatimg ε1 allows us to compute λ∗ and λc, now denoted λ∗
a, and λc
a to stress their
dependence on εa
1, using formulas (23) and (24). By construction, the optimal growth rate is µ0.
An alternative way to estimate ε1 is to note that it corresponds an elasticity, i.e. ε1 = ∂ lnσ
∂ ln(1+µ) as
derived from (18). One possibility to calibrate this parameter is to turn to the empirical research on
inequality and growth. Such estimates appear in this literature and often suggest that the relationship
between inequality and growth is negative, but these results have recently been challenged.17 For
example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) as well as Persson and Tabellini (1994) present evidence that the
relationship between inequality and growth is negative but Partridge (1997) disputes the robustness of
their ﬁndings. Deninger and Squire (1998) argue that data in previous studies of this relationship were
of low quality. Using improved measures, they ﬁnd that asset inequality reduces long-term growth
but that it is detrimental to the income growth of the poor rather than the rich. Forbes (2000)
argues that these studies suﬀer from omitted-variable bias and that the relationship is positive. This
elasticity could also be computed as the percentage diﬀerence in inequality relative to the percentage
diﬀerence in gross growth rates for two similar countries with initially similar levels of consumption
17See Benabou (1996) for a survey.
26per-capita (so that 4ln(1 + λ) = 0). Since there still does not seem to be a consensus on the
sign or magnitude of ε1 in the empirical literature, we prefer to use the natural experiment oﬀered
by the 1945 separation of East and West Germany. These former countries likely had very similar
levels of per-capita consumption and inequality by the end of the Second World War. The radically
diﬀerent social regimes imposed after the war caused a major divergence of per-capita consumption
and inequality over a period of 44 years. According to Biewen (2000, Table 2) by 1990 the log
variance of income per capita (σ2
y) was 0.23 in West Germany and 0.1150 in East Germany. This
implies a ratio
σywest
σyeast = 1.41. Assuming the same ratio for the standard deviation of consumption,
then 4lnσ = ln1.41.
Moreover, according to Biewen (2000, Tables 1 and 2), in 1990 mean income in West Germany was
1686.6 and 782 in west Germany, a ratio of 2.15. This ratio is partly conﬁrmed by Burda and Hunt
(2001, Table 3) who report a ratio of 2.32. This ratio exaggerates the existing gap right before the fall
of the Berlin wall in 1989 because GDP in East Germany dropped dramatically after reuniﬁcation.
According to Burda and Hunt (Table 3), GDP in East Germany fell 15.6% and 22.7% in 1990 and
1991 respectively while GDP in West Germany grew 5.7% and 4.6% during the same period. A




1.057∗1.046 = 1.37. Using data from the The Penn
World Table Mark 5.6, this ratio was 1.95 in 1970 but only 1.28 in 1988. Overall, these numbers
suggest a range for the ratio of per-capita consumptions in 1989 of 1.4 to 1.9. Assuming a ratio
of per-capita consumptions of 1 in 1945 and 1.65 in 1989, the ratio of annual growth rates is given
by
1+µwest
1+µeast = 1.651/44. This implies that 4ln(1 + µ) = ln
1+µw






The ﬁrst row of Table 5 reports the optimal levels of inequality for diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.
It ranges from 0.676 for γ = 1 to 0.15 for γ = 20. These results suggest that the current degree
of inequality in the US is optimal if the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is around 2. However, if the
coeﬃcient is larger than 2, as the equity-premium puzzle suggests, then the current level of inequality
is excessive. If γ = 5, for example, then the optimal inequality level is similar to that of Scandinavian
27countries. Figure 4 illustrates both the optimal choice for the US and the actual choice for inequality
and growth. At the observed choice, the production possibility frontier and the social indiﬀerence
curve for inequality and growth are not tangent, indicating that US consumers would beneﬁt from
lower inequality.
Table 5 also reports the calibrated values of εa
1. They range from 3.4 for γ = 20 to 43.5 for γ = 1.




construction the optimal growth rate for this case is µ0 = 2.1% regardless of γ. Consistently with the
previous ﬁnding, if γ is around 2 then current US choices are approximately optimal and its welfare
costs are close to zero. But welfare cost of current choices are signiﬁcant for other values of γ. If
γ = 5 instead, then reducing inequality to an optimal level of σ∗ = 0.3 would cost a 20% reduction
in consumption level but would have a welfare gain of 15%.
Finally, Table 5 reports the values of µ∗, λ∗, and λc associated with εb




b respectively. As γ goes to 1, it becomes optimal to sacriﬁce all consumption (λ∗
b → −1) in
order to obtain an inﬁnite growth rate of output. Notice that εa
1 ≈ εb
1 for γ = 2. This reinforces
our previous ﬁnding that current US choices for inequality level, growth, and consumption levels, are
close to optimal if γ = 2. However, current US choices have signiﬁcant welfare costs if γ 6= 2. For the
case of γ = 5, the optimal inequality level is still a level similar to that of Scandinavian countries,
σ∗ = 0.3, but now the tradeoﬀ is between inequality and growth rather than inequality and levels.
In fact, for γ = 5, the optimal policy would require leaving consumption levels around the baseline
level, but reducing inequality would imply a fall of the growth rate from 2.1% to 0.45%. Whether this
scenario is the relevant one or not, an important consequence of this ﬁnding is that the gains from
economic growth do not always dwarf the costs of inequality, as Lucas suggested. It is very plausible
that the burden of inequality is suﬃciently large to merit some sacriﬁce in terms of economic growth.
4 Final Comments
The main lottery individuals face during their lifetime is their place of birth, and the second, their
parents. Children that are identical in all respects will start their life with vast diﬀerences in resources
28and opportunities, depending on which country and what family they are born in. How much
consumption level and growth would a new born child be willing to give up in order to avoid these
birth lotteries? Lucas’ (2004) suggests this child would give up very little. Even if the child is born
poor, economic growth would help him or her overcome poverty. In this paper we show that, on
the contrary, this child may well be willing to give up all growth to avoid birthplace risk, and a
large fraction of growth, if not all, to avoid family risk. The critical elements for our results are
time discounting and risk aversion. Both factors downplay the role of growth for welfare while risk
aversion enhances the beneﬁts of more equal outcomes. A third key factor is the size of the risk
involved at birth, which is staggering.
The contribution of this article is to quantify the social cost of inequality under the most standard
assumptions made in macroeconomic theory. Our results suggest that societies could greatly beneﬁt
from reducing inequality. They also suggest the existence of a ‘big tradeoﬀ’ between inequality
and eﬃciency, as described by Okun (1975), and help rationalize why societies may not always ﬁnd
it optimal to adopt growth-enhancing institutions, particularly when inequality is large and those
institutions may foster inequality.
Societies commonly face major choices between equality on one hand and eﬃciency and growth
on the other hand. The degree of progressivity of the tax system, for example, reveals the willingness
to trade equality for eﬃciency. Other examples are trade liberalization and labor market reforms,
which are often regarded as beneﬁcial for economic eﬃciency but detrimental in terms of equality.
Similarly, the extent of law enforcement, illustrated for example in the eﬀorts to crack down on tax
evasion or informal markets, is inﬂuenced by distributional concerns at the expense of eﬃciency and
growth. Migration policies are also strongly inﬂuenced by this tradeoﬀ. Any correct evaluation of
institutional and policy choices made by diﬀerent societies requires the proper assessment of the
welfare implications of these choices, and in particular, a careful consideration of the welfare gains of
eﬃciency and growth against the welfare costs of more inequality. Our results suggest that inequality
concerns are of the utmost importance and should be explicitly considered in any aggregate evaluation
of institutions.
Public discussions of the costs of inequality and the value of redistributive policies are often
29framed in political than academic discourse and can lead to mistaken impressions of their eﬀect on
social welfare. Glaeser (2005) argues that social attitudes towards inequality in the U.S. and Europe
are more the result of ideological language from all sides of the political spectrum than reality. We
believe that our work provides an important ﬁrst step in objectively evaluating the costs of inequality
in a well-understood welfare framework.
A caveat of our exercise is that we have not fully speciﬁed the micro foundations of the tech-
nological restrictions for inequality, consumption growth and levels. We postulate a reduced-form
technology, and calibrate it using natural experiments rather than cross-country regressions. Some es-
timates of the inequality-growth tradeoﬀ appear in the empirical literature on inequality and growth,
but there is still no consensus on this relationship. Since most countries seem to share the same
long run growth rate, we suspect that the main tradeoﬀ is not between inequality and growth, but
inequality and consumption levels. In future research, we hope to improve our measurement of these
technological constraints using panel data for inequality and consumption levels.
Finally, our exercise suggests that the following is the proper ranking of issues in macroeconomics
from the point of view of their potential social welfare impact: cross-country inequality, within-
country inequality, economic growth, and business cycles.
30Figure 1: Log of Average World Per Capita Consumption, 1960-2000





Source: Penn World Tables 6.1 and authors calculations
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31Figure 2: Standard Deviation of Log of Average World Per Capita Consumption, 1960-2000
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32Table 1: Parameter values
µ0 = 2.1% (average per-capita consumption growth rate),
σx = 1 (standard deviation of per-capita consumption across countries),
σy = 0.5 (standard deviation of individual consumption within countries),
γ = [1,2,5,10,20] (coeﬃcient of risk aversion),
β = [0.952,0.952,0.949,0.939,0.904] (discount factor).
Table 2: Welfare Measures - Standard Formulation
γ 1 2 5 10 20
β 0.9521 0.9517 0.9488 0.9394 0.9037
λµ 0.5107 0.4050 0.2548 0.1545 0.0766
λ1% 0.2155 0.1571 0.0842 0.0449 0.0205
λx -0.3965 -0.6321 -0.9179 -0.9933 -1.000
λy -0.1186 -0.2212 -0.4647 -0.7135 -0.9179
λ0 -0.4681 -0.7135 -0.9561 -0.9981 -1.000
Note: λµ is the welfare gain of economic growth; λ1% is the welfare gain associated with one additional percentage
point of growth; λx is the welfare cost of cross-country consumption inequality; λy is the welfare cost of within-country
consumption inequality; λ0 is the welfare cost of total inequality.
33Table 3: Welfare Measures - Alternative Formulation
γ 1.0001 2 5 10 20
β 0.9521 0.9517 0.9488 0.9394 0.9037
b λµ -0.3381 -0.2883 -0.2031 -0.1338 -0.0711
b λ1% -0.1773 -0.1358 -0.0777 -0.0430 -0.0201
b λx 0.6570 1.718 11.18 147.4 22052
b λy 0.1346 0.2840 0.8682 2.4903 11.182
b λ0 0.8800 2.4903 21.759 517.01 268336
Note: ˆ λµ is the welfare cost of zero growth; ˆ λx is the welfare gain of no cross-country consumption inequality; ˆ λy is the
welfare gain of no within-country consumption inequality; ˆ λ0 is the welfare gain of no inequality.
Table 4: Welfare Measures - Growth and Inequality Equivalents
γ 1 2 5 10 20
β 0.9521 0.9517 0.9488 0.9394 0.9037
µx -0.0256 -0.0449 -0.0340 -0.0279 -0.0263
µy -0.0065 -0.0162 -0.0315 -0.0279 -0.0263
µ0 -0.0319 -0.0504 -0.0340 -0.0279 -0.0263
θx 0.8170 0.3400 0.0908 0.0287 0.0074
θy 3.2679 1.3602 0.3631 0.1149 0.0295
θ0 0.6536 0.2720 0.0726 0.0230 0.0059
λx -0.0883 -0.4831 -0.8970 -0.9922 -1.000
λy 0.3315 0.0942 -0.3284 -0.6692 -0.9116
λ0 -0.1964 -0.5975 -0.9449 -0.9978 -1.0000
MRSx
1 0.0521 0.1488 0.7417 2.8942 13.116
MRS
y
1 0.0260 0.0744 0.3709 1.4471 6.5582
MRS0
1 0.0582 0.1663 0.8293 3.2358 14.664
MRSx
2 1.0000 2.0000 5.0000 10.000 20.000
MRS
y
2 0.5000 1.0000 2.5000 5.0000 10.000
MRS0
2 1.1292 2.2361 5.5902 11.180 22.360
Note: µx, µy and µ0 are the points of economic growth that the planner would be willing to accept in exchange for
eliminating cross-country inequality, within-country inequality, and total inequality; θx, θy and θ0 are the percentage
reduction in cross-country inequality, within country inequality, and total inequality respectively that a planner would
be willing to accept in exchange for zero economic growth; λx, λy and λ0 is the welfare cost (gain if negative) of






34Figure 3: Social Indiﬀerence Curves





































































































σ, standard deviation of per−capita consumption
Social optimum at observed choices for γ=5
PPF
Social indifference curve γ=5
35Table 5: Optimal Inequality, Growth, and Consumption Levels
γ 1 2 5 10 20
β 0.9521 0.9517 0.9488 0.9394 0.9037
σ∗ 0.6724 0.4778 0.3022 0.2137 0.1511
εa
1 43.38 30.06 15.07 7.72 3.41
µ∗
a 0.0210 0.0210 0.0210 0.0210 0.0210
λ∗
a 0.1448 -0.0205 -0.2054 -0.3217 -0.4210
λc
a -0.0327 -0.0010 -0.1536 -0.4693 -0.8219
εb
1 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
µ∗
b ∞ 0.0211 0.0045 0.0009 -0.0016
λ∗
b -1.0000 -0.0224 -0.0066 -0.1091 -0.2130
λc
b -1.0000 -0.0010 -0.2089 -0.5394 -0.8563
Note: σ






a =optimal growth, λ
∗
a =optimal consumption level, and λ
c
a=welfare
cost of baseline, values computed assuming σ











b=welfare cost of baseline, values computed using German data.
36Figure 4: Optimal Inequality and Growth
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